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ANTITRUST-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-GROUP Boycorr-NFL COLLEGE
DRAFT-The United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia has held that the National Football League's annual college
draft is a concerted refusal to deal amounting to a group boycott,
and is thus a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
James McCoy (Yazoo) Smith,' whose football career ended in his
first year of professional play,2 brought an antitrust action3 against
the Washington Redskins and the National Football League (NFL).
Smith argued that the college draft,4 in which he had been selected,
prevented him from marketing his services in an open market, and
accordingly, denied him the opportunity to negotiate a contract that
would have safeguarded him economically in the event of a dis-
abling injury. He further asserted that the college draft was in
1. An All-American college football player from the University of Oregon, Smith was the
first round choice of the Washington Redskins in the National Football League (NFL) annual
college draft in January, 1968. He was the twelfth player in the nation to be drafted that
season. Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 740 (D.D.C. 1976).
2. The plaintiff suffered a broken neck in the last game of the 1968 NFL season and was
medically advised to discontinue playing football. Brief for Plaintiff at 2, Smith v. Pro-
Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (1976).
3. The Sherman Antitrust Act makes illegal "every contract, combination ... or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade" in interstate or foreign commerce, and prohibits monopolizing,
attempts to monopolize, and combinations or conspiracies to monopolize any part of inter-
state or foreign commerce. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides
that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor. . . and shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970).
4. The college draft rule, contained in the NFL constitution and by-laws, provides that a
selection meeting of the NFL clubs will be held annually in January or February. Each
participating club can select prospective players of its own choice; the selecting club has the
exclusive right to negotiate with the selected player. Without the consent of the selecting
club, no other club can negotiate with the player. See Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 76 (N.D.
Cal. 1974). The draft gives the club with the poorest record during the preceding season the
first choice from the graduating college football players, the club with the next poorest record
has the second selection, and the process continues until the club with the best record picks
last. See 420 F. Supp. at 741.
5. On May 11, 1968, the plaintiff signed a one-year contract with the Redskins, the
standard player agreement which the NFL constitution and bylaws require all players to sign.
The contract called for a bonus of $23,000, an additional $5,000 if he made the team, and a
salary of $22,000, totaling $50,000 for the 1968 season. Id. at 740. See Kornmehl, National
Football League Restrictions on Competitive Bidding for Players' Service, 24 BuFFALo L.
REv. 613, 616 nn.1-9 (1975) for an examination of the NFL's constitution, by-laws, rules and
regulations.
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essence a concerted refusal to deal,' constituting a group boycott7
which is a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Acts and
sought treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.'
The defendants contended that the college draft was a subject of
mandatory bargaining and immune from antitrust scrutiny under
the labor law exemption'0 since the NFL and the bargaining agent
for the players, the National Football League Players Association
(NFLPA), had reached a collective bargaining agreement." Alterna-
tively, they argued that the college draft was not a group boycott
since its purpose was not to restrain competition but to maintain
competitive balance among the teams collectively. According to
6. The term "concerted refusal to deal" has been defined as "an agreement by two or more
persons not to do business with other individuals, or to do business with them only on
specified terms." Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 618. (8th Cir. 1976), citing Note, Concerted
Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1531 (1958).
7. The term "group boycott" generally connotes "a refusal to deal or an inducement of
others not to deal or to have business relations with tradesmen." Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d
606, 618 (8th Cir. 1976), citing Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy
of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 569, 580 n.49 (1964).
8. See note 3 supra for the relevant text of the Sherman Act. A few practices or agreements
such as group boycotts, price fixing, and tying arrangements are conclusively presumed
unreasonable and are therefore classified as per se illegal. Because of their anticompetitive
effect and lack of any redeeming virtues, the law regards these restraints as so inherently
anticompetitive that they are struck down without consideration of their motives, purposes,
or effects. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (imposition of
appreciable restraint on free competition in a tied product held per se illegal); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing conspiracy held per se illegal).
9. See note 3 supra for the relevant text of the Clayton Act.
10. The labor law exemption from antitrust laws is found in § 6 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 17 (1970), and §§ 4 & 5 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105 (1970).
These sections provide that labor unions are not conspiracies or combinations in restraint of
trade, and specifically exempt certain labor activities (such as secondary picketing and boy-
cotts) from coverage of the antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970). See also Connell Constr.
Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) (although union activity is inherently
anticompetitive, it is favored by federal labor policy and statutorily exempted from antitrust
laws). Labor unions are subject to antitrust scrutiny in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (antitrust laws apply to labor activities that
restrain competition if either the intent or effect of the activity monopolizes the supply,
controls prices, or discriminates between would-be purchasers). See generally E. KINTNER, AN
ANTITRUST PRIMER 124-30 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as KINTNER].
11. After a bargaining agent has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board,
the employer and the union must bargain in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employemnt. See C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 389 (1971).
The plaintiff signed his contract with the Redskins on May 11, 1968. The NFLPA became
the representative of the players upon execution of the first collective bargaining agreement
with the NFL owners in November, 1968. 420 F. Supp. at 742.
12. Brief for Defendants at 20, Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendants].
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the defendants, professional football was a unique business, each
team's successful operation being dependent upon the success of the
other clubs."3 The college draft, as a means of distributing player
talent to maintain competitive balance, was vital to the success of
that business. If the college draft were subject to antitrust scrutiny,
the draft should be governed by the rule of reason,' according to the
defendants, rather than the per se approach" normally applied in
traditional group boycott cases," and the draft was within the per-
missible limits of the rule of reason as articulated by the United
States Supreme Court."
The court first addressed, and rejected, the defendant's argument
that the draft was beyond the purview of the antitrust laws because
it fell within the so-called "labor law exemption." Judge Bryant
began from the premise that in order for the exemption to apply,
there must have been a collective bargaining agreement in existence
at the time the alleged illegal activity took place. Here, however, the
plaintiff had signed his contract with the Washington Redskins be-
fore the NFL and the NFLPA entered into a collective bargaining
agreement. 8 Since Smith's cause of action arose before the labor law
exemption became effective, the court concluded that the claimed
exemption could not be invoked. 9 Moreover, the court held that
even if the exemption applied, it would not have barred Smith from
recovery. The purpose of the labor law exemption was to allow un-
ions to arrive at bargains in their own self-interest with respect to
13. Id. at 6.
14. The rule of reason applies where the restraints on trade and commerce have restrained
competition but certain redeeming features exist which save them from being conclusively
presumed unreasonable. The concerted conduct sought to be insulated from antitrust scru-
tiny must be no more restrictive than necessary to achieve its legitimate purpose. See, e.g.,
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (adoption of the rule of
reason).
15. See note 8 supra.
16. 420 F. Supp. at 744-45. The defendants argued that under the rule of reason, it is for
the court to decide whether the college draft procedures are reasonable or unreasonable in
light of their purpose and effect in the unique business of professional football. The court
should then examine the facts and assess the actual impact on competition to decide whether
the draft restrictions have an anticompetitive effect on the marketplace. See, e.g., White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-63 (1963) (analyzing vertical territorial restric-
tions and applying the rule of reason); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958) (practices lacking redeeming virtues which unreasonably affect competition held ille-
gal per se).
17. See note 14 supra.
18. See note 11 supra.
19. 420 F. Supp. at 742.
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wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, and Judge
Bryant determined that the NFLPA did not bargain in its own self-
interest in regard to the college draft.2"
The court then addressed the primary issue of whether the college
draft, in restricting a football player's ability to market his services,
unreasonably restrained competition in interstate commerce,2'
thereby constituting the kind of group boycott that historically has
been held to be a per se violation of the antitrust laws.2 Noting that
the applicability of the antitrust laws to professional football is
undisputed,23 the court viewed the restrictions attending the college
draft as a naked restraint of trade-a flagrant refusal to deal-
which constituted a group boycott "in its classic and most perni-
cious form."24 The college draft's sole purpose was to stifle compe-
tition in the marketplace, and such direct and purposeful anti-
competitive practices were per se illegal. 5 The plaintiff was there-
fore awarded treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act for
losses arising from the imposition of the college draft in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.2"
Although the court's determination that the college draft was a
20. Id. at 744.
21. See note 3 supra for the relevant text of the Sherman Act. Today almost any activity
which involves interstate commerce comes under antitrust scrutiny. See KINTNER, supra note
10, at 19.
22. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (location clause held
per se illegal); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961)
(boycott to suppress competition); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
(1959) (public injury not essential for per se illegality); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941) (purpose of particular boycott unimportant).
23. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional football not exempt from
antitrust scrutiny).
24. 420 F. Supp. at 744-45, citing White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
The court cited White for the proposition that concerted refusals to deal constitute group
boycotts and are therefore per se illegal. In rejecting the defendants' contention of necessity
for the college draft, the Smith court referred to the Supreme Court's rejection of a necessity
argument:
[The] exclusion of traders from the market by means of combination or conspiracy is
so inconsistent with the free-market principles embodied in the Sherman Act that it
is not to be saved by reference to the need for preserving the collaborators' profit
margins or their system [of organizing their distribution operation].
420 F. Supp. at 745, citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966).
25. 420 F. Supp. at 745.
26. Id. at 747-49 & nn.7 & 8. The court found that damages suffered by Smith could not
be calculated exactly since there was no free market to measure the value of players' services.
The court made a reasonable estimate of damages in the amount of $276,600, plus costs and
attorney's fees.
Vol. 15: 747
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per se violation of the antitrust laws arguably should have fully
disposed of the case, the court went on to analyze the draft under
the rule of reason. Judge Bryant concluded that the college draft in
its present form would not pass muster even under a rule of reason
analysis, 27 which focuses on whether the restraint imposed is a rea-
sonable and justifiable means of pursuing legitimate business inter-
ests and does not unreasonably restrain competition. 8 The court
declared that even if the college draft served legitimate business
interests, it did not survive a rule of reason analysis since the college
draft as presently structured was not the least restrictive means of
effectuating those interests. 9
An analysis of the Smith court's determination that the draft was
a per se violation of antitrust law must begin by examining the
court's characterization of the draft as a group boycott. The concept
of per se illegality developed from the courts' confrontation with
recurring antitrust problems arising under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Experience with various business practices eventually led fed-
eral courts to identify certain agreements and practices which were
considered so inherently anticompetitive as to warrant a conclusive
presumption of illegality. 0 Group boycotts are one such practice,
and to support its decision that the plaintiff was the victim of a
group boycott, the Smith court cited four classic boycott cases that
involved restrictive trade agreements between business competi-
tors .3'
27. Id. at 745. See note 14 supra.
28. See generally Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (only
unreasonable restraints declared unlawful).
29. 420 F. Supp. at 747. The court declared that the college draft was the most restrictive
alternative imaginable. It then suggested two possible alternatives to the present college
draft: (1) a draft consisting of only two rounds instead of seventeen, which would allocate
the most talented players but would permit competition for the services of all others; and
(2) a draft allowing more than one team to select each player while limiting the number of
players any one team could sign. Id. at 747 n.6.
30. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
31. The four cases were United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966)
(agreement designed to eliminate competition among dealers selling GM cars); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (conspiracy not to supply
gas to a manufacturer); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)
(agreement between department store and its suppliers not to do business with the store's
competitor except on discriminatory and unfavorable terms); Fashion Originators' Guild v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (agreement among competing clothing designers to destroy all
competition from manufacturers producing copies of their products). In all four cases, the
Supreme Court held the practice in question per se illegal.
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The difficulty with applying these cases to the activity in Smith
is that in all four cases, the agreements or conspiracies were among
horizontal competitors and the intended victim of the boycott was
the horizontal competitor of one or more of the conspirators. The
conspirators in each case acted for the sole purpose of eliminating
their competitors from the marketplace. These cases support the
Smith court's holding only if the college draft can be characterized
as an agreement between horizontal competitions-that is, involv-
ing competitors on the same level in the market structure. 32
In United States v. National Football League,33 the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that the Na-
tional Football League (NFL) member teams are not horizontal
business competitors. This court recognized that professional foot-
ball teams are more akin to joint venturers in that each member
club has a stake in the operating success of the other. 34 The unusual
extent to which the member clubs of a football league are dependent
upon each other for their business and economic survival distin-
guishes professional football from other businesses which do not
depend upon competitors for their economic survival. The objective
of other businesses is to weaken their competitors, or to eliminate
them altogether, from the marketplace. The NFL's college draft, on
the other hand, is designed primarily to replenish the league with
fresh talent by spreading talent evenly among the teams, thus main-
taining a competitive balance throughout the league by strengthen-
ing weaker competitors. This fundamental distinction was glossed
over by the Smith court, and arguably supports the position that it
misapplied precedent in citing the group boycott cases as determi-
native of the antitrust issue. Moreover, assuming the NFL is more
akin to a joint venture rather than a conspiracy among horizontal
competitors, the court would have had to apply the rule of reason
rather than conclude that the draft was per se illegal. The Supreme
Court has specifically held that joint ventures are governed by the
32. "Horizontal restraint" denotes restraint on the same level in the market structure, for
example, manufacturer to manufacturer or owner to owner, whereas "vertical restraint"
denotes restraint on different levels in the market structure, for instance, manufacturer to
distributor or owner to player. See United States v. Topco Assocs. 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
33. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
34. Id. at 323. See also Brief for Defendants, supra note 12, at 20: "[Plrofessional teams
in a league . . . must not compete too well with each other in a business way . . . or . . .
the stronger teams would be likely to drive the weaker ones into financial failure."
Vol. 15: 747
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rule of reason and not the per se rules when found to have a lawful
business purpose with restraints ancillary thereto.3"
If the NFL draft can be said to involve any restraint it would be
a "vertical" one, since the restraint is imposed by team owners
against another "level" of competition, the players.36 Were the draft
held to be a vertical restraint, it does not follow a fortiori that it
constitutes a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In
White Motor Co. v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with the issue of whether vertical territorial restrictions38
should be declared per se illegal. The Court refused to apply the per
se rules to such restrictiong, opting instead for a rule of reason ap-
proach 9.3  It reasoned that since the case involved a relatively new
business practice, it should look to the effects of the activity and its
impact upon the marketplace before making a judgment whether it
was so anticompetitive, and so lacking in any redeeming virtue, as
to be classified as per se illegal.4" In United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.,' the Supreme Court held that vertical restrictions
upon "outright sales," where the manufacturer had parted with title
and dominion over the goods, were per se illegal. Restraint on
"agency sales," however, where the manufacturer retains all the
indicia of ownership-including title, dominion and risk-were to
be governed by the rule of reason.2 Schwinn thus squarely holds
that not all vertical restraints are per se illegal. It would be difficult
to conceptualize the draft as involving any kind of outright sale
necessary according to Schwinn to constitute a per se violation.43
35. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint undertaking with
lawful purpose should be judged by the rule of reason).
36. See note 32 supra.
37. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
38. Vertical territorial restrictions occur where the manufacturer of products assigns cer-
tain territories to his wholesalers or retailers. See KINTNER, supra note 10, at 43.
39. 372 U.S. at 263. White Motor Company sold its trucks to dealers who agreed to resell
them only to customers who were not reserved to White Motor and had a place of business
or purchasing headquarters within the assigned territory. The Court concluded that not
enough was known without full presentation of evidence and trial on the merits to justify a
conclusion that this practice was per se illegal. Id.
40. Id. at 263-64.
41. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
42. Id. at 379-82. Schwinn has been referred to as the "bicycles built for two" case since
the Court applied both a per se and rule of reason analysis. It has been one of the most
criticized cases in the antitrust field because the Schwinn per se rule is inconsistent with legal
standards applicable to comparable vertical restraints. See Pollock, The Schwinn Per se Rule:
The Case for Reconsideration, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1976).
43. The Supreme Court has recently reconsidered Schwinn in Continental T.V., Inc. v.
1977
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Professional football's yearly draft is a unique device, designed to
insure the continued existence of the league. It is well established
in antitrust law that where special industry or business circumstan-
ces exist, the challenged business practice is measured by the rule
of reason.44 Such special industry or business circumstances have
been characteristically recognized where the challenged practice is
necessary to the survival of the business or industry involved.45 The
draft is, at the very least, arguably necessary to the survival of the
league. Accordingly, this unique scheme perhaps should have been
analyzed solely under the rule of reason in determining whether it
transgressed antitrust laws.
Both the Smith court's holding that professional football is ame-
nable to the same antitrust analysis as ordinary businesses, as well
as its finding that the draft is a per se violation, are not in accord
with recent federal decisions which have considered the same issues.
In United States v. National Football League,4" the district court
pointed out that professional football is unlike ordinary businesses
and is unique in its basic structure. The district court was not alone
in recognizing the uniqueness of this sport. 7 In cases recognizing the
peculiar nature of professional athletics and procedures for spread-
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 2549 (1977), refusing to apply the per se rule to certain vertical
territorial restrictions. In essence, the Supreme Court in GTE Sylvania returned to the rule
of reason approach of White Motor. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra. As a result
of this Supreme Court decision, it seems clear that the rule of reason approach is appropriate
to govern the legality of certain vertically inposed restrictions.
44. See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (dissolution of
trade association for disseminating price information without identifying sellers or buyers
held not price fixing and per se rule not applicable); Chastain v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975) (restraint held to be technologically necessary and per se
application thus unsuitable). Cf. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard,
Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974) (per se rule inapplicable
to by-laws prohibiting member banks from joining other national bank credit card systems).
But cf. United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930) (per se rule applicable
to agreement to deal only with buyers who meet prescribed credit standards). See generally
KINTNER, supra note 10, at 21.
45. See Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974) (rule of reason applicable in recognition of the
need for banks to join together to produce the product being sold since bank acting alone
could not do so). See also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (purpose
of "call-rule" found legitimate and the restraint ancillary).
46. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
47. In Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the court enjoined the
defendant from moving to another club while under contract with one club, stating that "the
unique character of the business . . . and the need for some form of protective system to
insure the recoupment of investments" is widely recognized. Id. at 879.
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ing available talent, under circumstances probably more restrictive
of its participants than the college draft, courts have eschewed the
per se analysis in favor of an inquiry into the reasonableness of the
restraint. 8 In Mackey v. National Football League,49 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently concluded that because the busi-
ness of professional football is unique in nature, it is inappropriate
to mechanically apply per se principles. 0
It is perhaps due to this contrary authority that the Smith court,
in what could be accurately characterized as pure dictum, analyzed
the college draft under the rule of reason test and concluded it was
nonetheless illegal.5 Employing this test, anticompetitive practices
between teams would be found illegal unless the practices were
found to be both essential to the viability of the league and the least
restrictive alternative available.52 The college draft, it follows,
would not violate antitrust laws if the purposes underlying it were
necessary to the continued viability of the league and placed no
more restrictions on players than were necessary.13 Reasonable re-
straints have been upheld despite some risk of anticompetitive ef-
fects. 4 Certainly, some reasonable restrictions are necessary for oth-
erwise weaker teams to maintain a competitive balance and thus
they are necessary to the successful operation of the league.5 Judge
Bryant may have been correct in concluding that the draft was
48. In Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the district court rejected the
per se illegality approach to professional baseball's reserve clause which contractually obli-
gated the player to a team for his entire professional career unless traded. That court stated
that the rule of reason should apply since some form of reserve system is essential to the
maintenance of the joint venture of professional baseball. Id. at 801 n.26.
49. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
50. Id. at 619. The trend has been to reject the per se approach not only in the professional
sports field but also in other businesses having a unique economic structure as well. See note
43 supra.
51. 420 F. Supp. at 745-47.
52. See Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Professional Sports, pt. 2, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 289 (1976) (testimony of Joe Sims, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust
Division, United States Dep't of Justice).
53. Id. at 289-90.
54. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), where the Court
upheld the adoption of Chicago Board of Trade's "call-rule" which prohibited its members,
until the opening of the next session, from purchasing or offering to purchase grain at a price
other than had been quoted at the close of business. The call-rule was designed not only for
the personal convenience of members but also to break up a monopoly acquired by some
warehousemen. The Court found the purpose of the call-rule legitimate, and the restraint of
minimal duration with no adverse effect on prices. Id. at 238.
55. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976).
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illegal under a rule of reason analysis, since it probably could be
conducted in a manner less restrictive of competition. The court
should have implemented the rule of reason from the start, however,
rather than analyzing the draft under this rule as an afterthought
to holding the draft to be a naked restraint of trade and per se
illegal.
The impact of the Smith decision could be considerable. Smith's
elimination of the college draft will require the owners to bid in an
open market for player services. This, in turn, will result in infla-
tionary "bonuses" and "salaries" to attract blue chip players. The
more talented players will probably gravitate to the highest bidders
and the more attractive cities. The effect may be the ultimate dete-
rioration of team equalization and competitive balance of the
league, since there will be no restriction whatsoever on player mobil-
ity.
The Smith court's determination that the college draft was illegal
under a rule of reason analysis may have been proper; it seems likely
that the available talent could have been fairly distributed in a
manner less restrictive of the players' ability to market their serv-
ices." But Judge Bryant's characterization of the draft as a group
boycott, and as a naked restraint of trade, evidences a fundamental
misunderstanding by the court of the unique aspect of a professional
football league and the attendant need to maintain some semblance
of balance among its member teams. The possibility exists that this
misunderstanding colored the court's examination of the draft
under the rule of reason, rendering it analytically suspect: deeming
the alleged restraint a "naked restraint of trade" arguably predeter-
mined the result under any antitrust analysis. The complexities of
professional sports militate against such a finding, however. It
would be unfortunate if the future of professional football is jeopar-
dized by courts which take inflexible stances on the scope and
applicability of federal antitrust laws.
Donn A. Clendenon
56. See note 29 supra.
Vol. 15: 747
